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Abstract: In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between
agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population
limit of the problem. In the infinite population limit, a generic agent is faced with a so-called mean-field game. In this
paper, we study discrete-time mean-field games with average-cost criteria. Using average cost optimality equation and
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria for mean-field games under drift and
minorization conditions on the dynamics of each agent. Then, we show that the equilibrium policy in the mean-field
game, when adopted by each agent, is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding finite-agent game with
sufficiently many agents.
Key words: Mean-field games, average cost, approximate Nash equilibrium.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider discrete-time mean-field games subject to average-cost criteria with Polish state and
action spaces. These games arise as the infinite population limit of finite-agent dynamic games, where agents
interact through the empirical distribution of their states. The main goal in mean-field games is to establish
the existence of an optimal policy and a state distribution that are consistent with each other. Then, this
optimal policy, when adopted by each agent, forms an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games
with sufficiently many agents.
Mean-field games have been introduced by Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [18] and Lasry and Lions [20] to
approximate continuous-time differential games with a large but finite number of identical agents interacting with
each other via empirical distribution of their states (i.e., mean-field term). The key feature of this approach
is to transform the game problem into a non-classical stochastic control problem by passing to the infinite-
population limit. In the infinite population limit, since empirical state distribution converges to a deterministic
probability measure by the law of large numbers, agents are decoupled from each other and each agent is faced
with a stochastic control problem that has a constraint on the distribution of its state. The latter problem is
called mean-field game in the literature. The optimal solution of this stochastic control problem provides an
approximate Nash equilibrium when the number of agents is sufficiently large. In continuous-time differential
games, this optimal solution is characterized by a Fokker-Planck equation evolving forward in time and a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time. We refer the reader to [3, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 23, 29]
∗Correspondence: naci.saldi@ozyegin.edu.tr
2010 AMS Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A15, 91A10, 91A13, 93E20.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
1
AUTHOR/Turk J Math
for studies of continuous-time mean-field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with
major-minor players, risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
Discrete-time mean-field games have not been studied much in the literature. Existing works have mostly
studied games with finite or countable state spaces subject to finite-horizon or infinite-horizon discounted cost
criteria. [10] considers a discrete-time mean-field game with a finite state space over a finite horizon. In [1],
discrete-time mean-field game with countable state-space is studied subject to an infinite-horizon discounted cost
criterion. References [9, 21, 22, 24] consider discrete-time mean-field games with linear state dynamics. There
are only three papers [5, 31, 32] studying discrete-time mean-field games subject to average cost criteria. In
[32], authors consider discrete set-up for average-cost mean-field games. In [5], the author considers average-cost
mean-field games with σ -compact Polish state spaces. In that paper, it was assumed that, for the finite agent
game problem, the dynamics of agents do not depend on the empirical distribution of the states. Under strong
regularity conditions on system components, [5] established the existence of Nash equilibria for finite-agent
games, and then, showed that these Nash equilibria converge to mean-field equilibria in the infinite-population
limit. These imposed regularity conditions are in general prohibitive because they are stated in terms of a specific
metric topology on the set of policies, and appear to be too strong to hold under reasonable assumptions. [31]
considers average-cost mean-field games with compact state spaces. This setup is the closest to the one studied
in this paper. However, in addition to the state space being compact, [31] also uses a completely different
technique to establish the existence of equilibrium in the infinite-population limit. Namely, [31] proves the
existence of mean-field equilibrium using ergodic properties of Markov chains induced by policies whereas we
employ here the dynamic programming principle, stated through average cost equation, to establish the existence
of mean-field equilibrium.
In [26] we studied infinite-horizon discounted-cost version of the same problem. Under mild assumptions
on the system components, we first established the existence of mean-field equilibrium and then proved that the
equilibrium in the mean-field game constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games when
the number of agents is sufficiently large. However, in the average-cost set-up, it is infeasible to establish similar
results under similar assumptions as analysis of average-cost criterion is much more difficult than discounted-cost
criterion. Therefore, to establish similar existence and approximation results, we impose drift and minorization
conditions on the system dynamics of each agent, which are a bit strong and but are quite common to study
average-cost stochastic control problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the infinite-population mean-field game
and define mean-field equilibrium. In Section 3, we formulate the finite-agent game problem of the mean-field
type. In Section 4, we prove the existence of a mean-field equilibrium. In Section 5 we establish that the
mean-field equilibrium policies lead to an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent games with sufficiently
many agents. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notation. For a metric space E , we let Cb(E) denote the set of all bounded continuous real functions on E
endowed with sup-norm ‖g‖ = supe∈E |g(e)| , which turns Cb(E) into a Banach space. Let P(E) denote the
set of all Borel probability measures on E . A sequence {µn} of measures on E is said to converge weakly to
a measure µ if
∫
E
g(e)µn(de) →
∫
E
g(e)µ(de) for all g ∈ Cb(E). We endow P(E) with weak topology induced
by weak convergence of probability measures. This topology is known to be metrizable, and if E is complete
and separable, then P(E) is also complete and separable under weak topology. For metric spaces E1 and E2 , a
stochastic kernel γ( · |e1) (or regular conditional probability measure) on E2 given E1 is a measurable function
γ : E1 → P(E2). A probability measure µ is called an invariant probability measure of a stochastic kernel γ
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on E given E if µ( · ) =
∫
E
γ( · |e)µ(de). For any subset B of E , we let ∂B and Bc denote the boundary and
complement of B , respectively. The notation v ∼ ν means that the random element v has distribution ν .
Unless otherwise specified, the term “measurable” will refer to Borel measurability.
2. Mean-field games and mean-field equilibria
The discrete-time mean-field game model is specified by
(
X,A, p, c, µ0
)
, where X and A are the Polish (complete
and separable metric space) state and action spaces, respectively. The stochastic kernel p : X×A×P(X)→ P(X)
denotes the transition probability law of the next state given the previous state-action pair and state-measure.
The measurable function c : X×A×P(X)→ [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function. The probability measure µ0
denotes the initial distribution of the state. A policy π is a stochastic kernel on A given X ; that is, π : X→ P(A)
is a measurable function, where P(A) is endowed with the Borel σ -algebra generated by the weak convergence
of probability measures. Let Π denote the set of all policies. According to the Ionescu Tulcea Theorem [13],
an initial distribution µ0 , a policy π , and a transition probability p define a unique probability measure P
pi
on (X× A)∞ . The expectation with respect to P pi is denoted by Epi .
Given any state-measure µ ∈ P(X), a policy π∗ ∈ Π is optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π),
where
Jµ(π) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Epi
[T−1∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µ)
]
is the average cost of policy π with state-measure µ . In this case, the evolution of the states and actions is
given by
x(0) ∼ µ0, x(t) ∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µ), t ≥ 1,
a(t) ∼ π( · |x(t)), t ≥ 0.
Define the set-valued mapping Ψ : P(X)→ 2Π as Ψ(µ) = {π ∈ Π : π is optimal for µ and µ0 = µ} .
Conversely, we define another set-valued mapping Λ : Π → 2P(X) as follows: given π ∈ Π, the state-
measure µpi is in Λ(π) if it is a fixed point of the following equation:
µpi( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, µpi)π(da|x)µpi(dx).
Under Assumption 1, which is given below, one can prove that Λ(π) has a unique element for all π . Therefore,
it is indeed a single-valued mapping.
The notion of an equilibrium for the average-cost mean-field game is defined via these mappings Ψ, Λ
as follows.
Definition 2.1 A pair (π, µ) ∈ Π× P(X) is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈ Ψ(µ) and µ ∈ Λ(π) .
The main goal in average-cost mean-field games is to establish the existence of a mean-field equilibrium.
To that end, we impose the assumptions below on the components of the mean-field game model. Note that a
3
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function w : X → [0,∞) is called a moment function if there exists a non-decreasing sequence of compact sets
Kn ↑ X such that
lim
n→∞
inf
x/∈Kn
w(x) =∞.
Assumption 1 (a) The cost function c is bounded and continuous.
(b) The stochastic kernel p is weakly continuous; that is, if (xn, an, µn) → (x, a, µ) , then p( · |xn, an, µn) →
p( · |x, a, µ) weakly.
(c) A is compact.
(d) There exists a non-degenerate sub-probability measure λ on X such that
p( · |x, a, µ) ≥ λ( · )
for all x ∈ X , a ∈ A , and µ ∈ P(X) .
(e) There exist a constant α ∈ (0, 1) and a continuous moment function w : X→ [0,∞) such that
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y) p(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x) +
∫
X
w(y)λ(dy). (2.1)
If we define the following sub-stochastic kernel pˆ( · |x, a, µ) = p( · |x, a, µ)− λ( · ), then (2.1) can be written as
sup
(a,µ)∈A×P(X)
∫
X
w(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, µ) ≤ αw(x). (2.2)
Note that condition (e) is so-called ‘drift inequality’ and condition (d) is so-called ‘minorization’ condition,
both of which were used in the literature for studying ergodicity of Markov chains (see [14], and references
therein). These assumptions are quite general for studying average cost stochastic control problems. Indeed,
Assumption 1-(d) is true when the transition probability satisfies conditions R1(a) and R1(b) in [15] (see also
[15, Remark 3.3] and references therein for further conditions). For Assumption 1-(e), we refer the reader to the
examples in [14, Section 7.4] to see under which conditions on the system components Assumption 1-(e) holds.
The main result of this section is the existence of a mean-field equilibrium under Assumption 1.
Theorem 2.2 Under Assumption 1, the mean-field game
(
X,A, p, c
)
admits a mean-field equilibrium (π∗, µ∗) .
It is important to note that mean-field games are not games in the strict sense. They are stochastic
control problems subject to a constraint on the distribution of the state at each time step. In other words, we
have a single agent and represent the collective behavior of (a large population of) other agents by an exogenous
state-measure µ ∈ P(X). This measure µ should also be consistent with the state distributions of this single
agent when the agent acts optimality. The proof of Theorem 2.2 is given Section 4. To establish the existence
of a mean-field equilibrium, we use dynamic programming principle for average-cost criterion, which is stated
via average cost optimality equation (ACOE), in addition to fixed point approach that is commonly used in
classical game problems.
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3. Finite Player Game
The motivation for studying mean-field games comes from the challenges to establish the existence of Nash
equilibria for large population stochastic dynamic games with mean-field interactions. More precisely, suppose
that we have a discrete-time N -agent stochastic game with state space X and action space A . For every
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} and every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} , let xNi (t) ∈ X and a
N
i (t) ∈ A denote the state and the action of
Agent i at time t , and let
e
(N)
t ( · ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · ) ∈ P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the states at time t (i.e., mean-field term), where δx ∈ P(X) is the Dirac
measure at x . The initial states xNi (0) are independent and identically distributed according to µ0 , and, for
each t ≥ 0, next states (xN1 (t+ 1), . . . , x
N
N (t+ 1)) are generated according to the probability distribution
N∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+ 1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ).
A policy for a generic agent is a stochastic kernel π on A given X . The set of all policies for Agent i is denoted
by Πi . Let Π
(N) =
∏N
i=1 Πi . We let pi
(N) = (π1, . . . , πN ), πi ∈ Πi , denote the N -tuple of policies for all
the agents in the game. Under such N -tuple of policies, actions (aN1 (t), . . . , a
N
N (t)) at each time t ≥ 0 are
generated according to the probability distribution
N∏
i=1
πi
(
daNi (t)
∣∣xNi (t)).
Note that agents can only use their local states when constructing their control laws. For Agent i , the average
cost under the initial distribution µ0 and N -tuple of policies pi
(N) ∈ Π(N) is given by
JNi (pi
(N)) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Epi
(N)
[T−1∑
t=0
c(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
.
We now define the notion of Nash equilibrium for this game problem as follows.
Definition 3.1 A N -tuple of policies pi(N∗) = (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where pi
(N∗)
−i = (π
j∗)j 6=i .
It is known that it is in general prohibitive to establish the existence of Nash equilibrium under decen-
tralized information structure. Moreover, when the number of agents is large, obtaining Nash equilibrium is
computationally intractable. Therefore, it is of interest to prove the existence of approximate Nash equilibrium.
To that end, we introduce the following solution concept:
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Definition 3.2 A N -tuple of policies pi(N∗) ∈ Π(N) is an ε -Nash equilibrium (for a given ε > 0) if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) ≤ inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i) + ε
for each i = 1, . . . , N .
In mean field games, the aim is now to show that the policy π∗ in the mean-field equilibrium, when adopted
by each agent, is ε -Nash equilibrium for games with sufficiently many agents. To that end, we need to impose
additional assumptions on the components of the game model.
Let ρ denote the following metric on P(X) that metrizes the weak topology:
ρ(µ, ν) =
∞∑
m=0
2−m
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
f(x)µ(dx) −
∫
X
f(x) ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣ ,
where fm ∈ Cb(X) and ‖fm‖ ≤ 1 for all m (see [25, Theorem 6.6, p. 47]). Define the following moduli of
continuity:
ωc(r) = sup
(x,a)∈X×A
sup
µ,ν:
ρ(µ,ν)≤r
|c(x, a, µ)− c(x, a, ν)|.
In addition to Assumption 1, we impose an additional assumption, which is stated below.
Assumption 2 (a) The transition probability p( · |x, a) does not depend on µ .
(b) ωc(r)→ 0 as r → 0 .
For average cost criterion, Assumption 2-(a) is quite common to establish the existence of approximate Nash
equilibrium (see [5, 31]). The following theorem is the main result of this section, which states that the policy
pi
(N∗) = (π∗, . . . , π∗), where π∗ is repeated N times, which itself is obtained from the mean-field equilibrium,
is an ε -Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large N .
Theorem 3.3 For any ε > 0 , there exists N(ε) such that for N ≥ N(ε) , the N -tuple of policies pi(N∗) is an
ε-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section 5.
4. Proof of Theorem 2.2
Under Assumption 1, for any (π, µ), there exists a unique probability measure µpi,µ such that
µpi,µ( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, µ)π(da|x)µpi,µ(dx) (4.1)
(see [30, Theorem 3.3], [12, Lemma 3.4]). Given µ ∈ P(X), we define the operator Tµ : Cb(X)→ Cb(X) as
Tµ u(x) = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
u(y) p(dy|x, a, µ)−
∫
X
u(y)λ(dy)
]
,
= min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
u(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, µ)
]
.
6
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Under Assumption 1, Tµ is a well-defined operator. One can also prove that Tµ is a contraction operator with
modulus β = 1−λ(X) ∈ (0, 1) [27, Theorem 3.21]. Therefore, for each µ , there exists a fixed point hµ ∈ Cb(X)
of Tµ by Banach Fixed Point Theorem. The following theorem characterizes the optimal policies for each
state-measure µ using the operator Tµ .
Theorem 4.1 Given µ ∈ P(X) , a policy π is optimal for µ when x(0) ∼ µpi,µ , if
νpi,µ
({
(x, a) : c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
hµ(dy) pˆ(dy|x, a, µ) = Tµ hµ
})
= 1,
where νpi,µ(dx, da) = µpi,µ(dx)π(da|x) and hµ is the fixed point of Tµ .
Proof Note that if Tµ hµ = hµ , then we have
hµ(x) + ρµ = min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
hµ(dy) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
,
where ρµ =
∫
X
hµ(dx)λ(dx). The last equation is called average cost optimality equation (ACOE) in the
literature [13]. Since
lim
n→∞
Epi[hµ(x(n))]
n
= 0,
for all π , as h is bounded, we have [13, Theorem 5.2.4]
ρµ = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π) =: J
∗
µ.
Suppose that π satisfies the hypothesis in the theorem. For each n ≥ 1 and γ ∈ P(X), we define
Jµ,n(π, hµ, γ) = E
pi
[n−1∑
t=0
c(x(t), a(t), µ) + hµ(x(n))
∣∣∣∣ x(0) ∼ γ
]
.
We claim that, for each n ≥ 1,
Jµ,n(π, hµ, µpi,µ) = nρµ +
∫
X
hµ(dx)µpi,µ(dx).
Claim clearly holds for n = 0. Suppose it holds for n and consider n+ 1:
Jµ,n+1(π, hµ, µpi,µ) =
∫
X×A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
Jµ,n(π, hµ, δy) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
π(da|x)µpi,µ(dx)
(a)
=
∫
X×A
c(x, a, µ)π(da|x)µpi,µ(dx) +
∫
X
Jµ,n(π, hµ, δy)µpi,µ(dy)
(b)
=
∫
X×A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
[
nρµ + hµ(dy)
]
p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
π(da|x)µpi,µ(dx)
= nρµ +
∫
X×A
[
c(x, a, µ) +
∫
X
hµ(dy) p(dy|x, a, µ)
]
νpi,µ(dx, da)
7
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(c)
= nρµ +
∫
X×A
[
Tµhµ(x) + ρµ
]
νpi,µ(dx, da)
(d)
= (n+ 1)ρµ +
∫
X×A
hµ(x)µpi,µ(dx),
where (a) follows from (4.1), (b) follows from
Jµ,n(π, hµ, µpi,µ) =
∫
X
Jµ,n(π, hµ, δx)µpi,µ(dx)
and induction hypothesis, (c) follows from the hypothesis in the theorem, and (d) follows from Tµ hµ = hµ .
This completes the proof of the claim. Note that
Jµ(π) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
Jµ,n(π, 0, µpi,µ)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
[
Jµ,n(π, hµ, µpi,µ)− E
pi[hµ(x(n))]
]
(a)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
Jµ,n(π, hµ, µpi,µ)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
[
nρµ +
∫
X
hµ(dx)µpi,µ(dx)
]
= ρµ = J
∗
µ,
where (a) follows from the fact that hµ is bounded. Therefore, π is optimal. ✷
Define the set Pc(X) as
Pc(X) =
{
µ ∈ P(X) :
∫
X
w(x)µ(dx) ≤
∫
X
w(x)λ(dx)
1− α
}
.
Since w is a continuous moment function, Pc(X) is compact [13, Proposition E.8]. We also define
Ξ = {ν ∈ P(X× A) : ν(dx, da) = µ(dx)π(da|x) for some (π, µ) ∈ Π× Pc(X)} .
Note that compactness of A and compactness of Pc(X) imply that Ξ is tight [13, Definition E.5], and so, Ξ is
relatively compact [13, Theorem E.6]. Since w is continuous, Ξ is closed. Therefore, Ξ is compact. For any
ν ∈ P(X× A), we let ν1 denote the marginal distribution on X .
Note that (π, µ) is a mean-field equilibrium if π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)). We transform this fixed point equation
π ∈ Ψ(Λ(π)) into a fixed point equation of a set-valued mapping from Ξ to 2P(X×A) . To that end, we define
the set-valued mapping Γ : Ξ→ 2P(X×A) as follows:
Γ(ν) = C(ν) ∩B(ν),
where
C(ν) =
{
ν′ : ν′1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da)
}
8
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and
B(ν) =
{
ν′ : ν′
({
(x, a) : c(x, a, ν1) +
∫
X
hν1(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1) = Tν1hν1(x)
})
= 1
}
.
Note that the set C(ν) characterizes the equation µ = Λ(π) and the set B(ν) characterizes the equation
π ∈ Ψ(µ). Under Assumption 1-(e), one can easily prove that the image of Ξ under Γ is contained in 2Ξ ; that
is, Γ(ν) ⊂ Ξ. Indeed, fix any ν ∈ Ξ. It is sufficient to prove that C(ν) ⊂ Ξ. Let ν′ ∈ C(ν). We have∫
X
w(y) ν′1(dy) =
∫
X×A
∫
X
w(y) p(dy|x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da)
≤
∫
X
αw(x) ν1(dx) +
∫
X
w(y)λ(dy) (by Assumption 1-(e))
≤
∫
X
w(x)λ(dx)
1− α
(as ν1 ∈ Pc(X)).
Hence, ν′1 ∈ Pc(X). This completes the proof of the claim. Therefore,
Γ : Ξ→ 2Ξ.
A point ν ∈ Ξ is a fixed point of Γ if ν ∈ Γ(ν). The following proposition makes the connection between
mean-field equilibria and the fixed points of Γ.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that Γ has a fixed point ν . Disintegrate ν as ν(dx, da) = ν1(dx)π(da|x) . Then the
pair (π, ν1) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof Let ν ∈ Γ(ν). Since ν ∈ C(ν), we have Λ(π) = ν1 = µpi,ν1 . Moreover, since ν ∈ B(ν), π is optimal
for ν1 when x(0) ∼ ν1 by Theorem 4.1; that is, π ∈ Ψ(ν1). This completes the proof. ✷
By Proposition 4.2, it suffices to prove that Γ has a fixed point in order to establish the existence of a mean-field
equilibrium. To prove this, we use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem ([2, Corollary 17.55]). Note that Ξ is convex.
Furthermore, it can be proved that C(ν) ∩B(ν) 6= ∅ for any ν ∈ Ξ. Indeed, we define
µ( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da).
Moreover, let f : X→ A be the minimizer of the following optimality equation:
c(x, f(x), ν1) +
∫
X
hν1(y) pˆ(dy|x, f(x), ν1)
= inf
a∈A
[
c(x, a, ν1) +
∫
X
hν1(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1)
]
.
Existence of such an f follows from the Measurable Selection Theorem [13, Section D]. If we define ν′(dx, da) =
µ(dx) δf(x)(da), then it is straightforward to prove that ν
′ ∈ C(ν) ∩ B(ν), and so, C(ν) ∩ B(ν) 6= ∅ . We can
also show that both C(ν) and B(ν) are convex, and thus their intersection is also convex. Moreover, Ξ is a
convex compact subset of a locally convex topological space M(X × A), where M(X × A) denotes the set of
finite signed measures on X×A . Therefore, to establish the existence of a fixed point of Γ via Kakutani’s fixed
point, we only need to prove the following:
9
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Proposition 4.3 The graph of Γ , i.e., the set
Gr(Γ) := {(ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ× Ξ : ξ ∈ Γ(ν)} ,
is closed.
Proof Here, we adapt the proof of [26, Proposition 3.9] to the average cost criterion. Let
{
(ν(n), ξ(n))
}
n≥1
⊂
Ξ × Ξ be such that ξ(n) ∈ Γ(ν(n)) for all n and (ν(n), ξ(n)) → (ν, ξ) as n → ∞ for some (ν, ξ) ∈ Ξ × Ξ. We
prove that ξ ∈ Γ(ν), which completes the proof.
We first prove that ξ ∈ C(ν). Note that, for all n , we have
ξ
(n)
1 ( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) ν
(n)(dx, da). (4.2)
Let g ∈ Cb(X). Then, by [19, Theorem 3.5], we have
lim
n→∞
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) ν
(n)(dx, da) =
∫
X×A
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da)
since ν(n) → ν weakly and
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) converges to
∫
X
g(y) p(dy|x, a, ν1) continuously∗ (see [28,
p. 388]). This implies that the sequence of measures on the right-hand side of (4.2) converges weakly to∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da). Therefore, we have
ξ1( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x, a, ν1) ν(dx, da),
which means that ξ ∈ C(ν).
We now prove that ξ ∈ B(ν), which implies that ξ ∈ Γ(ν). To prove this, we use the continuity properties
of the average cost optimality equation. For each n , let us define
F (n)(x, a) = c(x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) +
∫
X
h
ν
(n)
1
(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 )
and
F (x, a) = c(x, a, ν1) +
∫
X
hν1(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1).
By definition,
h
ν
(n)
1
(x) = inf
a∈A
F (n)(x, a) and hν1(x) = inf
a∈A
F (x, a).
By assumption, we have
1 = ξ(n)
({
(x, a) : F (n)(x, a) = h
ν
(n)
1
(x)
})
, for all n.
∗Suppose g , gn (n ≥ 1) are measurable functions on metric space E . The sequence gn is said to converge to g continuously
if limn→∞ gn(en) = g(e) for any en → e where e ∈ E .
10
AUTHOR/Turk J Math
Let A(n) =
{
(x, a) : F (n)(x, a) = h
ν
(n)
1
(x)
}
. Since both F (n) and h
ν
(n)
1
are continuous, A(n) is closed. Define
A =
{
(x, a) : F (x, a) = hν1(x)
}
which is also closed as both F and hν1 are continuous.
We first prove ξ ∈ B(ν) by supposing that F (n) converges to F continuously and h
ν
(n)
1
converges to hν1
continuously, as n→∞ . Then, we prove these statements.
For each M ≥ 1, define closed set BM =
{
(x, a) : F (x, a) ≥ hν1(x) + ǫ(M)
}
, where ǫ(M) → 0 as
M →∞ . Since both F and hν1 are continuous, we can choose {ǫ(M)}M≥1 so that ξ(∂B
M ) = 0 for each M .
As Ac =
⋃∞
M=1B
M and BM ⊂ BM+1 , we have by the monotone convergence theorem
ξ(n)
(
Ac ∩ A(n)
)
= lim inf
M→∞
ξ(n)
(
BM ∩A(n)).
Hence, we have
1 = lim sup
n→∞
lim inf
M→∞
{
ξ(n)
(
A ∩ A(n)
)
+ ξ(n)
(
BM ∩ A(n)
)}
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim sup
n→∞
{
ξ(n)
(
A ∩ A(n)
)
+ ξ(n)
(
BM ∩ A(n)
)}
.
Fix any M . Note that ξ(n) converges weakly to ξ as n → ∞ when both measures are restricted to BM , as
BM is closed and ξ(∂BM ) = 0 (see [6, Theorem 8.2.3]). Furthermore, 1A(n)∩BM converges continuously to 0.
Indeed, if (x(n), a(n))→ (x, a) in BM , then
lim
n→∞
F (n)(x(n), a(n)) = F (x, a)
≥ hν1(x) + ǫ(M)
= lim
n→∞
h
ν
(n)
1
(x(n)) + ǫ(M).
Hence, for large enough n , we have F (n)(x(n), a(n)) > h
ν
(n)
1
(x(n)), which implies that (x(n), a(n)) 6∈ A(n) , and
so, 1A(n)∩BM (x
(n), a(n)) = 0. Therefore, by [19, Theorem 3.5], for each M , we have
lim sup
n→∞
ξ(n)
(
BM ∩ A(n)
)
= 0.
Therefore, we obtain
1 ≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ(n)
(
A ∩ A(n)
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
ξ(n)(A)
≤ ξ(A),
where the last inequality follows from the Portmanteau Theorem (see [4, Theorem 2.1]). Hence, ξ(A) = 1. This
means that ξ ∈ B(ν). Therefore, ξ ∈ Γ(ν) which completes the proof under the condition that F (n) converges
to F continuously and h
ν
(n)
1
converges to hν1 continuously, as n→∞ , which we prove next.
For continuous functions, continuous convergence is the same as uniform convergence on compact sets
(see [19, Lemma 2.1]). Therefore, we show that F (n) uniformly converges to F over compact sets and h
ν
(n)
1
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uniformly converges to hν1 over compact sets, as these functions are continuous. Furthermore, if hν(n)1
converges
to hν1 continuously, then F
(n) also converges to F continuously. Indeed, let (x(n), a(n)) → (x, a). By [19,
Theorem 3.5] we have
lim
n→∞
F (n)(x(n), a(n)) = lim
n→∞
[
c(x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) +
∫
X
h
ν
(n)
1
(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 )
]
=
[
c(x, a, ν1) +
∫
X
hν1(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1)
]
= F (x, a).
Therefore, it is enough to prove that h
ν
(n)
1
uniformly converges to hν1 over compact sets. The following
proposition establishes this result.
Proposition 4.4 For any compact K ⊂ X , we have
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈K
∣∣h
ν
(n)
1
(x) − hν1(x)| = 0.
Proof To ease the notation, let T (n) = T
ν
(n)
1
, h(n) = h
ν
(n)
1
, T = Tν1 , and h = hν1 . Let u
(n)
0 = u0 = 0 and
u
(n)
k+1 = T
(n)u
(n)
k and uk+1 = Tuk.
Since T (n) and T are contractive operators on Cb(X) with modulus β , it can be proved that
‖u
(n)
k − h
(n)‖, ‖uk − h‖ ≤ L0 β
k, (4.3)
for some constant L0 .
For any compact K ⊂ X , one can prove that
lim
n→∞
sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k (x) − uk(x)∣∣ = 0, (4.4)
for all k ≥ 0. Indeed, fix any compact K ⊂ X . Since u
(n)
0 = u0 = 0, the claim trivially holds for k = 0.
Suppose that the claim holds for k . Then, consider k + 1:
sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k+1(x) − uk+1(x)∣∣
= sup
x∈K
∣∣∣∣mina∈A
[
c(x, a, ν
(n)
1 ) +
∫
X
u
(n)
k (y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 )
]
−min
a∈A
[
c(x, a, ν1) + β
∫
X
uk(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1)
]∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣c(x, a, ν(n)1 )− c(x, a, ν1)∣∣
+ sup
(x,a)∈K×A
∣∣∣∣
∫
X
u
(n)
k (y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν
(n)
1 )
12
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−
∫
X
uk(y) pˆ(dy|x, a, ν1)
∣∣∣∣.
Note that c(· , · , ν(n)) converges to c(· , · , ν) continuously as n→∞ . Furthermore, since u
(n)
k converges to uk
continuously, by [19, Theorem 3.5]
∫
X
u
(n)
k (y)pˆ(dy|· , · , ν
(n)
1 ) converges to
∫
X
uk(y)pˆ(dy|· , · , ν1) continuously as
n → ∞ . Since continuous convergence is equivalent to uniform convergence over compact sets for continuous
functions, the last expression goes to zero as n→∞ . This proves (4.4).
Using (4.4), we now complete the proof of Proposition 4.4. Fix any compact K ⊂ X . For all k ≥ 0, we
have
sup
x∈K
∣∣h(n)(x)− h(x)| ≤ ‖h(n) − u(n)k ‖+ sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k (x)− uk(x)∣∣ + ‖uk − h‖
≤ 2L0β
k + sup
x∈K
∣∣u(n)k (x) − uk(x)∣∣ (by (4.3)).
This last expression can be made arbitrarily small by first choosing large enough k and then large enough n .
✷
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.3 as F (n) converges to F continuously and h
ν
(n)
1
converges to
hν1 continuously by Proposition 4.4. ✷
Recall that Ξ is a compact convex subset of the locally convex topological space M(X×A). Furthermore,
Γ has closed graph by Proposition 4.3, and it takes nonempty convex values. Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem (see [2, Corollary 17.55]), Γ has a fixed point. Then, Theorem 2.2 follows from Proposition 4.2.
5. Proof of Theorem 3.3
To prove Theorem 3.3, we mimic the idea used in [31] of formulating N -agent game as a stochastic control
problem over an extended state space and action space. Namely, we consider N -agent game as a stochastic
control problem with state space XN =
∏N
i=1 X , action space A
N =
∏N
i=1 A , transition probability
PN(dy1, . . . , dyN |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(dyi|xi, ai),
and one-stage cost function
CN (x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN ) = c
(
x1, a1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi
)
.
Here, the initial state (x1(0), . . . , xN (0)) is generated by the product measure µ
N
0 =
∏N
i=1 µ0 . For any N -tuple
of policies pi(N) , the average-cost of this stochastic control problem is the same as the average-cost of Agent 1
in the game; that is,
JN1 (pi
(N)) = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[T−1∑
t=0
CN
(
xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N (t), a
N
1 (t), . . . , a
N
N (t)
)]
.
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for all N , the following are satisfied:
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(i) The one-stage cost function CN is bounded and continuous.
(ii) The stochastic kernel PN is weakly continuous and satisfies
PN ( · |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN ) ≥ λ
N ( · ) =
N∏
i=1
λ( · ), ∀ (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X
N , (a1, . . . , aN) ∈ A
N (5.1)
sup
(a1,...,aN )
∫
XN
wN (y1, . . . , yN ) pˆ
N(dy1, . . . , yN |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN ) ≤ α
N wN (x1, . . . , xN ), ∀ (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X
N
(5.2)
where wN (x1, . . . , xN ) =
∏N
i=1 w(yi) and pˆ
N ( · |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN ) = p( · |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN) − λN ( · ).
Under (5.1) and (5.2), for any pi(N) , the following stochastic kernel on XN given XN
Ppi
(N)
( · |x1, . . . , xN ) =
∫
AN
PN ( · |x1, . . . , xN , a1, . . . , aN )
N∏
i=1
π(dai|xi)
has an unique invariant distribution µ
pi
(N) ∈ P(XN ) and we have
JN1 (pi
(N)) =
∫
XN×AN
c
(
x1, a1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi
)
N∏
i=1
πi(dai|xi)µpi(N)(dx1, . . . , dxN ).
(see [30, Theorem 3.3], [12, Lemma 3.4]). Moreover,
µ
pi
(N)(dx1, . . . , dxN ) =
N∏
i=1
µpii(dxi),
where, for each i = 1, . . . , N , µpii is the unique invariant probability measure of the stochastic kernel
∫
A
p( · |x, a)πi(da|x).
The following result is the key to prove Theorem 3.3.
Proposition 5.1 For any π ∈ Π1 , we have
∣∣Jµ∗(π) − JN1 (π,pi(N∗)−1 )∣∣ ≤ ǫ(N),
where
ǫ(N) =
∫
XN−1×AN−1
ωc
(
ρ
(
µ∗,
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
δxi
))
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN ) + ωc
(
2 ·
(
1−
N − 1
N
+
1
N
))
.
Note that, by law of large numbers and the fact that ωc(r)→ 0 as r → 0 , ǫ(N)→ 0 as N →∞ .
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Proof Fix any policy π for Agent 1. Since µpi is the unique invariant distribution of the stochastic kernel∫
A
p( · |x, a)π(da|x), we can write
Jµ∗(π) =
∫
X×A
c(x1, a1, µ
∗)π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
(see [30, Theorem 3.3], [12, Lemma 3.4]). Then, we have
∣∣Jµ∗(π)− JN1 (π,pi(N∗)−1 )∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
c(x1, a1, µ
∗)π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
−
∫
XN×AN
c
(
x1, a1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi
)
π(da1|x1)
N∏
i=2
π∗(dai|xi)µpi,pi(N∗)
−1
(dx1, . . . , dxN )
∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
c(x1, a1, µ
∗)π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
−
∫
X×A
[∫
XN−1
c
(
x1, a1,
δx1
N
+
N − 1
N
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi
)
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN )
]
π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
c(x1, a1, µ
∗)π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
−
∫
X×A
[∫
XN−1
c
(
x1, a1,
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi
)
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN )
]
π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
X×A
[∫
XN−1
c
(
x1, a1,
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi
)
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN )
]
π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
−
∫
X×A
[∫
XN−1
c
(
x1, a1,
δx1
N
+
N − 1
N
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi
)
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN )
]
π(da1|x1)µpi(dx1)
∣∣∣∣
(b)
≤
∫
XN−1
ωc
(
ρ(µ∗,
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi)
)
µ∗(dx2) . . . µ
∗(dxN ) + ωc
(
2 ·
(
1−
N − 1
N
+
1
N
))
,
where (a) follows from the fact that µ∗ is the unique invariant probability measure of the stochastic kernel∫
A
p( · |x, a)π∗(da|x) and µpi is the unique invariant probability measure of the stochastic kernel
∫
A
p( · |x, a)π(da|x),
and (b) follows from
ρ
(
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi ,
δx1
N
+
N − 1
N
1
N − 1
N∑
i=2
δxi
)
= 2 ·
(
1−
N − 1
N
+
1
N
)
.
This completes the proof. ✷
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.3. We prove that, for sufficiently large N , we have
JNi (pi
(N)) ≤ inf
pi∈Πi
JNi (pi
(N)
−i , π) + ε (5.3)
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for each i = 1, . . . , N . Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the same for all
agents in the game, it is sufficient to prove (5.3) for Agent 1 only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let π˜(N) ∈ Π1
be such that
JN1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) < inf
pi∈Π1
JN1 (π, π
∗, . . . , π∗) +
ε
3
.
Let N(ε) be such that ǫ(N) ≤ ε3 for all N ≥ N(ε). Then, by Proposition 5.1, we have
inf
pi∈Π1
JN1 (π, π
∗, . . . , π∗) + ε > JN1 (π˜
(N), π∗, . . . , π∗) +
2ε
3
≥ Jµ∗(π˜
(N)) +
ε
3
≥ inf
pi∈Π
Jµ∗(π) +
ε
3
= Jµ∗(π
∗) +
ε
3
≥ JN1 (π
∗, π∗, . . . , π∗).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
6. Conclusion
This paper has considered discrete-time mean-field games subject to average cost criteria, for Polish state and
action spaces. Under drift and minorization conditions on the state transition kernel, the existence of a mean-
field equilibrium has been established for infinite-population game models using the average cost optimality
equation. We have then applied the policy in mean-field equilibrium to the finite population game and have
proved that it constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for games with a sufficiently large number of agents.
One interesting future direction of research to pursue is to study partially observed version of the same
problem. By converting partially-observed system into a fully-observed one over a belief-state space, it might
be possible to establish similar results for the partially-observed case.
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